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I. INTRODUCTION

This is a most perplexing time for gay rights advocates.' On the one
hand, people can be encouraged by any number of recent legal
advancements that allow gay and lesbian citizens to participate fully in
American life-from getting married, to adopting and raising children, to
being employed without fear of discrimination or of being fired for being
gay. On the other hand, however, there have been a number of recent legal
setbacks for the gay community, including so-called "marriage
amendments" to state constitutions that prohibit same-sex marriage, court
decisions that have gone against same-sex partners attempting to adopt
their children, and failures in efforts to add anti-discrimination clauses to
existing laws.
This myriad of results stems from our system of governance, which has
its roots in the United States Constitution. In keeping with the Tenth
Amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people [,]" 2 the evolution of law regarding
gay citizens has largely occurred in the states, not at the federal level.3 The
advancements and setbacks referenced above are largely statewide and
leave local governments in the position of dealing with the consequences of
these decisions. From another perspective, however, local governments
have a great deal of autonomy in creating or advocating for laws and
ordinances that speak to the concerns of gay constituents, despite statewide
setbacks or inaction regarding issues of importance to gay citizens. As the
government closest to the people, and arguably the government most in
touch with the people, it is appropriate that municipal governments
examine how they can lawfully fill in the gaps where state law neglects its
gay citizens.4 However, doing so also requires an understanding of the

1. For a recent essay on trying to determine how many people in the United States
are gay, see Gary J. Gates, LGBT Identity: A Demographer'sPerspective,45 LOY. L.A.
L. REv. 693, 694 (2012). Gates is a Williams Distinguished Scholar at the Williams
Institute at the UCLA School of Law, a sexual orientation and gender identity law and
public policy think-tank. Gary J. Gates, Williams DistinguishedScholar, WILLIAMS
(last visited
INST., http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/experts/gary-gates/gary-gates/
Oct. 25, 2012).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3. Cases where parties have challenged the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the United States Constitution have appropriately been brought in federal
court; for example, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). However, many
challenges regarding the legal rights of gay persons, for example, are in the fields of
family law and employment law, fields traditionally under the purview of state law.
4. This Article focuses on municipal rather than county or other forms of local
Although the issues discussed herein are universally important,
government.
municipalities are the focus because, in the author's opinion, the persons elected to lead
municipalities are the officials that have the most intimate contact with regular citizens.
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political realities of these initiatives within the framework of state law.
This Article explores the prospects for local government implementation
of legal protections for gay persons in the absence of state or federal
protections. Part II of this Article gives an overview of how municipal
government legal authority is determined state-by-state; this is largely
based on their state constitution, specific laws passed by their state's
legislature, and court decisions. Part III provides a general summary of the
current status of legal rights for gay citizens in the states, thus categorizing
the states in a way that showcases those states that are not providing for
their gay citizens at the state level, and are particularly ripe for local legal
advocacy. Part IV examines various mechanisms local governments can
initiate to protect and advocate for the legal rights of their gay citizens in
states (and a nation) where such rights protection is not yet the norm, while
balancing community and political expectations.5 Part IV also includes
case studies that represent these types of undertakings. This Article
concludes by emphasizing once again that local government can, indeed
should, be the catalyst for change in the legal rights arena for gay citizens.
II. LOCAL LEGAL AUTHORITY
Upon taking office, a local official often has grand ideas about specific
local laws he or she wishes to urge his fellow council or board members to
pass. Unfortunately, discovering how challenging this can be is often a
harsh reality for the new officeholder. Setting aside for the moment the
further task of getting buy-in for the idea from the other members, the
official has to make certain that what he or she proposes is allowed by law.
This Part explores concepts related to the legal authority of local
governments to pass laws.
A. Hunter v. Pittsburgh
One might think that cities or towns are sovereign entities of great
power. Not so! The Tenth Amendment gives the states the authority to
create municipalities; once created, the state still has much authority over
the municipality.6 The landmark case emphasizing this principle is the
United States Supreme Court case of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, where
Justice Moody said:
5. This Article primarily focuses on the gay and lesbian population, although the
discussion herein is often also applicable to the transgender population. The use of the
term "gay" citizens throughout the text is meant to include gays and lesbians.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.").
7. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (rejecting the attempt to
impose constitutional limits on state power over cities).
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Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of
the state as may be entrusted to them. . . . The number, nature, and

duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the
territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute
discretion of the state. . . . The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may
modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation
such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or
contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this
may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the
consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects,
the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the
state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States. Although the inhabitants and property
owners may, by such changes, suffer inconvenience, and their property
may be lessened in value by the burden of increased taxation, or for any
other reason, they have no right, by contract or otherwise, in the
unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and
there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects them from
these injurious consequences. The power is in the state, and those who
legislate for the state are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive
exercise of it.8
Hunter dealt with an issue of annexation and spoke primarily to

geographic boundaries and the existence of municipalities. However, its
threshold statement is startling: essentially, municipalities can be banished
by the state with no recourse. To that end, the statement that "[t]he power
is in the state, and those who legislate for the state are alone responsible for
any unjust or oppressive exercise of it" seems to be an acknowledgement
by the Court that certain decisions by the state, while unjust, are
definitively without recourse in the federal courts.9
B. Dillon'sRule and Home Rule

Ascertaining the breadth of local legal authority is not an easy process
and varies by state.' 0 At a minimum, it involves the study of a state's
constitution, laws, and court decisions. There are no "model rules" for
local governance, but there are principles which heavily influence the

8. Id. at 178-79.
9. Id. at 179 (determining that, despite the inconveniences suffered by the
inhabitants of and property owners in municipalities, nothing in the Constitution
protects them from annoyances, such as increased taxation).
10. For a general overview of local legal authority, see the home page for the
National League of Cities at Cities 101, NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/

build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101 (last visited Oct. 25, 2012).
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degree of authority of local governments. Over the past century and a half,
the authority of many municipalities was determined by a legal analysis,
which involved the use of "Dillon's Rule."" As stated by Professor
Briffault, "[u]nder Dillon's Rule, local governments may exercise only
those powers 'granted in express words,' or 'those necessarily or fairly

implied in or incident to, the powers expressly granted,' or 'those essential
to the declared objects and purpose of the [municipal] corporation-not
simply convenient, but indispensable."'l 2 Briffault notes that the rule
"operates as a standard of delegation, a canon of construction and a rule of
limited power."' 3 By requiring all local powers be traceable to a specific
delegation, Dillon's Rule reflects the view of local governments as agents
of the state. Therefore, if uncertainty exists as to whether a locality
possesses a particular power, the court assumes that the locality lacks that
particular power.14 Although formally denounced by many states, the rule
remains a canon of construction, still making an occasional appearance in
case law, particularly when courts are looking to construe a power
narrowly.' 5
In many states, the concept of localized power, or "home rule," 6 is given
to the municipality by way of a constitutional grant. Other states grant
"home rule" specifically by statute. In still others, this grant of power is
not called "home rule" but can mirror home rule to a degree.' 7 In all states,
however, the notion of "preemption" or "occupation of the field" by federal
or state law reins in home rule.
In his article Reclaiming Home Rule, Professor Barron describes the
tension that courts wrestle with as they balance the home rule doctrine with
the perceived need to limit local control.' 8 Professor Barron suggests that:
[t]here is a broad, if overlooked, middle space within which one can
I1. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1990) (noting that Dillon's Rule is the traditional
measure for determining the scope of local power).
12. Id
13. Id.
14. Id
15. Id at 6 nn.4 & 8 (describing the contention of Professor Frug that "the Dillon's

Rule tradition" causes many state courts to construe local powers narrowly, and this

opinion has been repeatedly cited by courts).
16. Home rule has its origins with the "crown"; for a brief review of the history of
home rule in the state of New York, see People ex rel. Metro. St. Ry. Co. v. State Bd.

of Tax Comm'rs, 67 N.E. 69, 70-72 (N.Y. 1903).

17. See Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Governments Need Home Rule?

84 N.C. L. REv. 1983, 1986 (2006) (suggesting that North Carolina municipalities may
have more definitive authority under various general statutes than they would if
municipalities were expressly granted "home rule").
18. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2257, 2261-63
(2003).
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challenge the substance of the particular mix of grants of, and limits on,
local power that now constitute what reformers and defenders of the
legal status quo both generally describe as "home rule." Meaningful
change need not, therefore, consolidate local governments into enormous
regional ones, nor need it strictly limit local powers to a narrow sphere.
Instead, it could alter the current mix of state law grants and limits that
gives substance to local legal power.
"Preemption" or "occupation of the field" occurs when certain issues
take on a national importance and, as such, are regulated by federal law to
the exclusion of state law, therefore prohibiting a state from passing a law
incompatible with federal law.20 Similarly, there may be a state regulatory
scheme that preempts the ability of local government to legislate in a given
area of the law.2 1

C. Local Legal Authority in the States
A survey of the state of local governance throughout the United States
suggests that nearly all of the states have or allow for some form of home
rule. Professor Barron observes that "all but two states now have express
constitutional or statutory home rule provisions." 22 The extent of those
home rule provisions varies, depending on their form. Some apply to all
municipalities, and some apply to towns or cities of a certain size. 2 3 Some
19. Id. at 2263.
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990); see also Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956) (explaining the test for federal preemption of a

field: "First, '[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it'[;]

...

Second,

the federal statutes 'touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the

federal system (must) be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject'[;] . . . Third, enforcement of [the state] acts presents a serious danger of
conflict with the administration of the federal program.").
21. See Hutchcraft Van Serv., Inc. v. City of Urbana Human Relations Comm'n,
433 N.E.2d 329, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) ("Preemption is a judicially created doctrine

and is more commonly found in decisions grappling with the problem of a federal
statute versus a state enactment. As applied to state action versus local action,
preemption means that where the legislature has adopted a scheme for regulation of a
given subject, local legislative control over such phases of the subject as are covered by
state regulation ceases.").
22. Barron, supra note 18, at 2260 (citing WILLIAM VALENTE ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 254 (5th ed. 2001)).

23. For example, in its constitution, the state of Colorado grants broad home rule to
all municipalities: "It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of
all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both
local and municipal matters and the enumeration herein of certain powers shall not be
construed to deny such cities and towns, and to the people thereof, any right or power
essential or proper to the full exercise of such right." COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. The
constitution for the state of Alaska provides that "[t]he qualified voters of any borough
of the first class or city of the first class may adopt, amend, or repeal a home rule
charter in a manner provided by law. . . . A home rule borough or city may exercise all
legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter." ALASKA CONST. art. X, §§ 9,

11.
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are self-executing and some require enabling legislation.2 4 Some home
rules are found in constitutions, and some in statutes. 25 Some grant very
broad home rule, and some grant what is known as "partial" home rule.26
In some states, in fact, there is argument as to whether there has even been
a grant of "home rule" to municipalities.2 7
A hybrid, of sorts, now exists in the state of North Carolina, once strictly
a Dillon's Rule state.28 North Carolina establishes local goverment
powers through specific, statutory delegations and not broad constitutional
or statutory grants of authority. "This is to say, North Carolina is not a
home rule state. And although North Carolina is often described as a
Dillon's Rule state, that designation is probably not accurate, at least
according to the most recent North Carolina appellate court opinions on the
subject." 2 9 This is evidenced by the fact that the scope of authority
delegated to local governments by statute is broader than the authority
granted local governments in home rule states.
In North Carolina, these statutes include the "general welfare clause," a
24. Colorado is the former; Alaska is the latter. See COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6;
ALASKA CONST. art. X, §§ 9, 11.
25. The authority for home rule in Colorado and Alaska is found in their
constitutions, supra notes 23, 24, while this authority can be found for other states in
statutes, such as in Delaware, where "[e]very municipal corporation in this State
containing a population of at least 1,000 persons as shown by the last official federal
decennial census may proceed as set forth in this chapter to amend its municipal charter
and may, subject to the conditions and limitations imposed by this chapter, amend its
charter so as to have and assume all powers which, under the Constitution of this State,
it would be competent for the General Assembly to grant by specific enumeration and
which are not denied by statute." 22 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 802 (2012).
26. While Colorado grants very broad home rule, supra note 23, other states such
as Illinois are more limited: "Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may
exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs
including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public
health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt." ILL. CONST.

art. 7, § 6.

27. Idaho only grants home rule to municipalities as to "police power"; in all other
respects, they are a Dillon's Rule state. See Caesar v. State, 610 P.2d 517, 520 (Idaho
1980) ("Article 12, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution has been viewed as a grant of local
police powers to Idaho cities. . . . It provides that 'Any county or incorporated city or
town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws'. . . .
Municipal corporations which enjoy a direct grant of power from the Idaho
Constitution are, however, limited in certain respects."); see also Sun Valley Co. v.
City of Sun Valley, 708 P.2d 147, 167 (Idaho 1985) ("This position, . . . known as
'Dillon's rule,' has been generally recognized as the prevailing view in Idaho.").
28. See, e.g., Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. Cnty. of Durham, 630 S.E.2d 200,
203-04 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("The narrow Dillon's Rule of statutory construction used
when interpreting municipal powers has been replaced by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4's
mandate that the language of Chapter 160A be construed in favor of extending powers
to a municipality where there is an ambiguity in the authorizing language, or the
powers clearly authorized reasonably necessitate 'additional and supplementary
powers' 'to carry them into execution and effect[.]' N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4.").
29. Bluestein, supra note 17, at 1985-86.
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statute which gives municipalities a broad grant of regulatory authority,30
as well as statutes that authorize regulation to local governments in specific
areas, permit the operation of public enterprises and facilities, and provide
broad authority with regard to land use planning.) Municipalities also
have the authority to enter into various forms of inter-local agreements and
establish separate entities for certain purposes.32 Municipalities can seek a
local act via special legislation to make the local authority clear in certain
circumstances.33 In short, identifying a state as one that does not authorize
home rule does not necessarily mean local governments in that state are
powerless.
Ascertaining the degree of legal authority that a local government has is
key to figuring out how to proceed when attempting to implement gay legal
rights initiatives. In sum, this involves first understanding the legal
authority that one's particular state grants to its localities. This authority is
generally found in the state's constitution or in the state's general laws. It
may be express, or implied, and case law likely refines it. This legal
authority may be found in a clear statement of home rule, or in a delegation
of limited power, such as a general welfare clause. After ascertaining the
scope of legal authority held by a local government, the next step is to
review any laws passed by the state that may preempt further legislation in
the specific field the locality is trying to regulate. Again, what is subject to
preemption may be express or implied, and further identified by case law.
III. LEGAL RIGHTS FOR GAY CITIZENS IN THE STATES

How does one quantify the current extent of legal rights in a state with
regard to gay citizens? A starting point might be to identify those areas of
the law where gay citizens are not treated equally statewide. Foremost
among these areas of inequality are marriage (or relationship recognition)
rights and adoption rights, followed by a variety of situations where
discrimination legally takes place. 34 This analysis will examine how state
law has developed in these areas, with the supposition that more
progressive states are those in which the most strides have been made with
regard to these areas of legal rights.

30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (2012).
31. Bluestein, supra note 17, at 2005-06; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-43(b),
153A-275, 160A-361 (2012).
32. Bluestein, supra note 17, at 2006; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 158-7.4, 160A-

462 (2012).
33. Bluestein, supra note 17, at 2009; see also N.C. CONsT. art. II, § 22(6).
34. These situations include employment, public accommodations, education, and
specific state programs.
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A. Relationship Recognition

Clearly, the most progressive states in this context are those that offer
marriage equality between citizens of the same sex. Marriage equality is a
state matter. Although the federal government passed the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, which defines marriage as "only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife," this
definition of marriage is only applied to federal laws and statutes;35
otherwise, each state determines its own definition of marriage.36 The
states that offer marriage equality include Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, Maine, Maryland, and
Washington, as well as the District of Columbia. 37 The legality of samesex marriage in California is making its way through the federal courts.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in February 2012 that the
Proposition 8 ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional; the United

35. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). This section reads as follows: "In determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the
various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and
the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife." Id.
36. DOMA also included a section that made it clear that no state must recognize a
marriage performed in another state: "No State, territory, or possession of the United
States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from
such relationship." 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
37. Same-sex marriage in Massachusetts was approved by the State Supreme

Judicial Court in Massachusetts on November 18, 2003. See Goodridge v. Dep't of

Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). In 2008, the Connecticut Supreme

Court found that the state's civil unions statute was unconstitutional in that it
discriminated against gay citizens. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 412 (Conn. 2008). On April 3, 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court, in Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009), approved same-sex marriage. Vermont
legalized same-sex marriage through legislation in 2009, becoming the first state to do
so.
See S. 115, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2009), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2010/Acts/ACT003.pdf. New Hampshire followed less
than two months later. H.B. 437-FN, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2011), available at
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2012/hb0437.html.
The November 2012
elections resulted in same-sex marriage becoming legal in Maine, Maryland, and
Washington. Erik Eckholm, In Maine and Maryland, Victories at the Ballot Box for
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/1 1/
07/us/politics/same-sex-marriage-voting-election.html; Same-Sex Marriage Rivals
Concede in Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/1 1/
09/us/washington-state-gay-marriage-opponents-concede.html.
In the District of
Columbia, a law was passed in 2009 that went into effect in 2010 allowing same-sex
marriage: "Marriage is the legally recognized union of 2 persons. Any person may
enter into a marriage in the District of Columbia with another person, regardless of
gender[.]" D.C. CODE § 46-401 (2012). In 2011, the hugely populous state of New
York passed a law allowing same-sex marriage. S. A8354-2011, 2011 Leg. (N.Y.
2011), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/A8354-2011.
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State Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 7, 2012.38
Not in the same category, but still affirming of relationship recognition
for gay citizens, are those states that allow civil unions or domestic
partnerships for same-sex couples.
States that offer these "broad"
relationship recognitions include Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey,
and Rhode Island, which allow civil unions, and Nevada and Oregon,
which allow domestic partnerships. 39 Finally, there are states that currently
offer some type of limited relationship recognition laws; these states are
Colorado and Wisconsin.40
On the opposite side of the spectrum from the above-referenced
jurisdictions are states that have gone in the other direction. These states,
in the aftermath of the passage of the federal DOMA, set about
memorializing their own definition of marriage as being between one man
and one woman; many of these states enacted this definition of marriage
not only by law but also by state constitution. 4 1 As of July 2012, thirty-one
states had amended their constitutions to include this definition.42 North
38. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted,2012 WL
3134429, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (Dec. 7, 2012). Speculation abounds as to what direction
the United States Supreme Court will take with the case; the Court could settle the
matter jurisdictionally, limit the holding to California, issue a decision with broader
implications, or do some combination of these. Adam Liptak, Same-Sex Issue Pushes
Justices into Overdrive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/
10/us/supreme-court-enters-same-sex-fray-with-uncharacteristic-speed.html. California
is in the odd position of having legalized same-sex marriage for a short time period.
Although the California Supreme Court upheld the legality of Proposition 8 in Strauss
v. Horton, it determined that the same-sex marriages that were performed between the
ruling in In re Marriage Cases (allowing same-sex marriage) and the passage of
Proposition 8 were valid. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 119 (Cal. 2009); In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 202 (2012); Act of July 6, 2012, 2012 Haw. Sess.
Laws Act 267; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West
2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A.100 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.325
(West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3.1-6 (West 2012). California is also
currently in this group. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2012).
40. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-104 (West 2012); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 853.12 (West 2012).
41. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage,
110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1422 n.1, 1423 n.6 (2012) (citing Same-Sex Marriage, Civil
Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx
(last updated June 2012)).
A stunning interactive map can be found at Gay Marriage Chronology, L.A. TIMES
(July 5, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://graphics.latimes.com/usmap-gay-marriage-chronology/,
which shows a yearly breakdown of the rights afforded to same-sex couples (fewest
and most) since 2000. While the map has not been intimately verified by the author, it
appears to be generally correct based on anecdotal knowledge of the various states.
42. One finds reference in the literature to either thirty or thirty-one states having
passed "marriage" amendments, defining marriage as between one man and one
woman. The reason for the disparity is the varied classification of Hawaii's
amendment, which reads, "The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. Some include it as one of the
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Carolina was the most recent to pass such an amendment on May 8, 2012.43
As one might expect, persons legally married to members of the same sex
in other states have difficulty attempting to get divorced in these states. 44
B. Second-ParentAdoption Rights

Reviewing a history of adoption laws throughout the years is like
looking at a snapshot of American culture.45 Once containing disdainful
references to bastards, requirements that a prospective parent be married
(always to a person of the opposite sex), or affirmations that the adopters
were active "churchgoers," adoption laws have evolved through the
46
decades to reflect our changing society. Influences such as the advent of
international adoption, the emergence of stepparents as prospective
adopters, the ability to have a child through artificial insemination, and the
relaxation of the requirement that two persons are needed to adopt-all of
these requirements, and more, have influenced revisions to adoption laws.
Historically, adoption laws allowed for a birth parent to: (1) give up his
or her child for adoption by terminating the parent's legal rights, or (2)
allow the child to be adopted by the birth parent's new spouse, but
preserving the birth parent's legal right to the child. There was no
provision for a birth parent to allow another person to adopt the child
jointly without the two marrying.4 7
In recent years, however, some states have allowed a process known as
marriage amendment states, some do not.
43. Campbell Robertson, North Carolina Voters Pass Same-Sex Marriage Ban,
N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/us/north-carolinavoters-pass-same-sex-marriage-ban.html.
Minnesota, however, successfully turned
away a constitutional same-sex marriage ban on November 6, 2012. Debbi Wilgoren,
Minnesota Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Ban, POST POL. (Nov. 7, 2012, 10:23 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/11/07/minnesota-votersreject-same-sex-marriage-ban/.
44. Compare Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967 (R.I. 2007) (state does not
recognize same-sex marriage or same-sex divorce), with Christiansen v. Christiansen,
253 P.3d 153, 154 (Wyo. 2011) (state does not recognize same-sex marriage but has
jurisdiction to allow same-sex divorce). For a discussion of this problem and a possible
solution, see Danielle Johnson, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction:A CriticalAnalysis of
Chambers v. Ormiston and Why Divorce Is an Incident of Marriage That Should Be
Uniformly Recognized Throughout the States, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 225, 226-27
(2010).
45. A timeline of adoption history is found in The Adoption History Project
(through the History Department at the University of Oregon) and can be found at
Timeline of Adoption History, ADOPTION HIST. PROJECT, http://pages.uoregon.edu/
adoption/timeline.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2012).
46. See
Adoption
History
in
Brief ADOPTION
HIST.
PROJECT,
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-adoption/topics/adoptionhistbrief.htm (last updated Feb.
24, 2012).
47. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES 1
(2012), available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/LegalRecognition of
LGBTFamilies.pdfdoclD=286 1.
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"second parent" adoption, a process by which a birth parent can retain his
or her legal rights to a child but can legally allow another adult to adopt the
child, creating two legal parents, even if the two do not marry.4 8 This
common sense interpretation (and in some states, revision) of the adoption
laws makes sense in a society with an emerging group of couples who
cannot procreate in the traditional way. At least twenty states, and the
District of Columbia, allow second parent adoption through either statutory
or case law. 49 There are five states that have specifically declined to allow
second-parent adoption.50 However, as a court order pursuant to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, all states are
required to recognize second parent adoptions performed in other states.si
C. Anti-discriminationLaws
Anti-discrimination laws arise in a variety of contexts in the public
sector and most commonly address employment, housing, and public
accommodation. Workplace nondiscrimination laws are intended to protect
persons throughout the interview process and beyond; once hired, these
protections continue in the workplace and while the employee is being
evaluated for promotion, retention, or dismissal.52
Additionally,
application of these laws includes considering whether benefits are being
offered equally to all employees. 5 3 Polls taken in recent years show that an
48. Id. at 2.
49. These are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington. Id.
Maryland should also be added to this list now that civil marriage is available in the
state for same-sex couples. John Wagner et al., Maryland Approves Same-Sex
Marriage Law, WASH. PosT (Nov. 7, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012I 1-07/local/35505987 1 marriage-law-marriage-measure-maryland-and-maine.
50. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 3. These states are
Note further that
Kentucky, North Carolina, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
Mississippi expressly prohibits adoption by same-sex couples. Utah does not allow a
co-habiting partner to adopt, and Utah and Alabama give preference to a married
couple over a single person. Id.
51. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state. Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the
manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. But see Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 149-50 (5th
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that Louisiana's refusal to issue a new birth certificate
pursuant to a valid New York adoption did not violate the Full Faith and Credit
Clause).
52. E.g. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2012).
53. Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace
DiscriminationAgainst LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting
Discrimination and Providingfor Equal Employment Benefits, 45 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
715, 761 (2012). This analysis can involve a review of a vast array of benefits, and
may differ by jurisdiction (for example, the availability of certain programs for family
members of employees).
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overwhelming number of persons in the United States believe gay people
should have equal rights in terms ofjob opportunities. 54
Certain classifications, such as race and gender, are already extended
workplace protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
Sexual orientation is not listed as a classification under this law. However,
there appears to be growing support for the federal Employment
Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA), which, with several caveats, would
prohibit workplace discrimination with regard to gay persons. 6 Although
ENDA has been introduced repeatedly in Congress every term since 1973,
it has never made its way to the floor for a vote. 7 Supporters are optimistic
that its passage will come in the near future.
Notwithstanding the lack of protections at the federal level, there are at
present twenty-one states, plus the District of Columbia, that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by virtue of state law.59 Of
the twenty-nine remaining states, discrimination against state employees on
the basis of sexual orientation is banned in eleven states by executive order,
although these have shortcomings when compared to other laws because
they can be, and have been, rescinded when there is a gubernatorial
change.60
Over two hundred cities and counties have passed
nondiscrimination employment laws with regard to sexual orientation. 6 1
Depending on the authority of the local government, these may apply only
to public employees; in other instances, they may apply to any business,
public or private, employing persons in the jurisdiction. 62 Despite these
efforts, the authors of one article have noted that "[s]everal academic
studies demonstrate that state and local administrative agencies often lack
the resources, knowledge, enforcement mechanisms, or willingness to
54. A 2008 Gallup poll showed that eighty-nine percent of persons surveyed think
that homosexuals should have equal rights in terms of job opportunities, as compared

to

fifty-six

percent in

1978.

See

Gay

and Lesbian Rights,

GALLUP,

http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx#1 (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).

56. See Pizer et al., supra note 53, at 719.
57. Id.
58. See The Rights of Gay Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/opinion/13sun2.html.
59. See Pizer et al., supra note 53, at 755 (listing all states that prohibit
discrimination).

60. Id. at 756.
61. Id. at 757.
62. See Michael A. Woods, The Propriety of Local Government Protections of
Gays and Lesbians from DiscriminatoryEmployment Practices, 52 EMORY L.J. 515,

527 (2012) ("[A]t the time of this writing, 136 cities and counties prohibit employment

discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by private employers, and an
additional 106 city and county governments prohibit discrimination in public
employment.").
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accept and investigate sexual orientation . .. discrimination complaints."63
The data has shown that these policies, while well-intended, have
limitations in terms of scope of coverage, enforcement, remedies, and
resources; further, they sometimes operate under the fear of repeal.64 There
are ten states with no such state or municipal laws. 65
This concern of "limitations in terms of scope of coverage" is a major
one. When one thinks of nondiscrimination policies, one thinks of not
being berated in the workplace or not being fired just because one is gay.
But this notion can be carried further; while not "categorically" workplace
discrimination, the absence of domestic partner benefits in states where
same-sex couples cannot get married conflicts with this notion that all
employees should be given equal access to benefits. 66 Reformers also often
overlook other benefits, such as leave time if one's family members are
sick, or access to retirement and pension plans, when attempting to equalize
workplace benefits for gay employees.67
Antidiscrimination clauses that address housing range in scope and
coverage. At the federal level, in early 2012, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) promulgated a comprehensive rule
addressing discrimination against gay persons intending to use their core
programs, noting "through this final rule, HUD implements policy to
ensure that its core programs are open to all eligible individuals and
families regardless of sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital
status." 68 The rule affirmatively states that "housing assisted or insured by
HUD must be made available without regard to actual or perceived sexual
orientation, gender identity, or marital status." 69 It also includes "the
prohibition of inquiries regarding sexual orientation or gender identity for
63. Pizer et al., supra note 53, at 757.
64. Id. at 759.
65. Id. at 757 (noting the states are Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming).
66. In fact, many employers, recognizing that even domestic partner benefits are
not the equivalent of health insurance coverage for one's spouse (because of tax'
implications), have started reimbursing their gay employees who have domestic partner
benefits a "tax offset" in an attempt to equalize this disparity. See Tara Siegel Bernard,
A Progress Report on Gay Employee Health Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/a-progress-report-on-gay-employee-healthbenefits/ [hereinafter Bernard, A ProgressReport].
67. See Pizer et al., supra note 53, at 768.
68. Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation
or Gender Identity, 77 Fed. Reg. 5662 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5,
200, 203, 236, 400, 570, 574, 882, 891, 982), available at http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=121gbtfinalrule.pdf. The rule was passed following "a
January 24, 2011, proposed rule, which noted evidence suggesting that lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals and families are being arbitrarily
excluded from housing opportunities in the private sector." Id.
69. Id. at 5663.
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the purpose of determining eligibility or otherwise making housing
available[.]', 7 0 The regulation also reorganizes the term "family" so that the
definition properly cross-references with other programs to cover LGBT
persons.
There is no other federal law or regulation against this type of
discrimination.
The housing laws of over twenty states, plus the District of Columbia,
prohibit discrimination against gay persons.72 Two hundred and twenty
localities prohibit this type of housing discrimination.7 ' These laws vary a
bit in scope and application. For example, the state of Washington's
housing non-discrimination law, which also contains an exemption, states:
(1) It is an unfair practice for any person, whether acting for himself,
herself, or another, because of... sexual orientation ... :
(a) To refuse to engage in a real estate transaction with a person; [or]
(b) To discriminate against a person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of a real estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities
or services in connection therewith; ...
(7) Nothing in this chapter shall apply to real estate transactions
involving the sharing of a dwelling unit, or rental or sublease of a portion
of a dwellin unit, when the dwelling unit is to be occupied by the owner
or subleasor.
This law exempts owner-occupiers from the law. These housing law
exemptions apply to many categories, not just sexual orientation.75 Some
70. Id.
71. These specific programs are the Housing Opportunities for Persons With AIDS
(HOPWA) program and the HUD's Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly
and Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities programs. Id.
72. These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, New
Hampshire, Illinois, Iowa, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington
and Wisconsin.
See In Your State, LAMBDA
LEGAL,
http://lambdalegal.org/states-regions (last visited Nov. 7, 2012); see also CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 12955 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-502 (West 2012); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (West 2009),
HAW. REV. STAT. § 515-3 (West 2012); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/1-102 (West
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.8 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §4581
(West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 20-705 (West 2012); MAsS. GEN. ANN.
LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.09 (West 2012); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.020 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (2012);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 2012); N.Y.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.421 (West
2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37-4 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503
(2012).
73. See Yishai Blank et al., The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. REv. 955, 978
(2012).
74. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.222 (West 2012).
75. The law covers "sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color,
national origin, families with children status, honorably discharged veteran or military
status, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained
dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability[.]" Id.
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anti-discrimination laws that address housing are part of a larger set of laws
One example is New York City's
that cover a variety of areas.
comprehensive Human Rights Law, which covers employment, housing,
public accommodations, and bias-related harassment. 6
A sometimes overlooked but growing body of law is public
accommodations with respect to discrimination and sexual orientation. By
its very name, this law deals with some degree of inclusion of the public,
but how these laws are written and interpreted, in many instances, requires
a careful balancing with the Free Exercise Clause and other liberties.7 7
Depending on the liberties at issue, the United State Supreme Court has
applied varying degrees of scrutiny in cases involving public
accommodation law that might burden religious exercise.78
At present, there is no federal law prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation, but twenty-one
states, plus the District of Columbia, have such laws, often as part of a
comprehensive set of nondiscrimination laws. 79 States have generally
followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court in granting
exemptions to these laws, but the application of this reasoning to a sexual
orientation classification is still evolving. One commentator notes
[the] exemptions [include] . . . actual places of religious worship, the

organizations they operate, and certain private organizations. As gaymarriage laws gain traction, public accommodations statutes are
uniquely positioned as a point of contention because marriage-related
public accommodations contexts are those in which the conflict appears
so commonly. Countless gray areas exist in which religious liberty and
gay rights conflicts extend beyond churches, mosques, or synagogues,
including: "[r]eligiously affiliated marriage-counseling services, daycare centers, retreat centers, summer family camps, or family community
76. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101 (2011); see also Levin v. Yeshiva
University, 754 N.E.2d 1099, 1099 (N.Y. 2001) (discussing where under New York
City's Human Rights Law, the plaintiffs stated a prima facie case of housing
discrimination based on sexual orientation).
77. The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause are included in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78. See Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public
Accommodations: An EmpiricalApproach to Religious Exemptionsfor Holdout States,
100 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1789 (2012).
79. See PatientNon-discriminationand State Public Accommodation Law, HUMAN
RTs. CAMPAIGN, http://preview.hrc.org/issues/12641.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2012)

(listing these states as California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
York, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and
Wisconsin); see also Non-discriminationLaws: State by State Information-Map,AM.
Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discriminationlaws-state-state-information-map.
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centers," and businesses owned or operated by religious individuals.80
Many cities have public accommodation non-discrimination laws that
cover sexual orientation regardless of whether their state's law covers such
conduct. For example, the city of Tampa, Florida, states on its website that
"rights to equal access and the full enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation are protected by federal and state laws, and the City of
Tampa's Human Rights Ordinance. . . ."8 Therefore, in this city, a person
cannot be denied equal access if the person has a characteristic that makes
them a member of a protected class. 8 2
One of the classes listed on the webpage is that of sexual orientation.83
Examples subject to the law include (but are not limited to): places or
resorts of amusement, inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, cafeterias, retail
establishments, gasoline stations, theaters, skating rinks, amusement parks,
bowling alleys, golf courses, concert halls, gymnasiums, sports arenas,
stadiums, places of exhibition or entertainment, library or educational
facilities supported in part or whole by public funds, taxis, limousines,
buses, barber and beauty shops, hospitals, laundries, swimming pools,
nurseries, kindergartens, and day-care centers.84 In these places, it is
unlawful to "[r]efuse, withhold from, deny or deprive, or attempt to
withhold from, deny or deprive any person of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation."85
80. Chapman, supra note 78, at 1790. Discussing the conflict, Chapman notes,
"Academia is filled with a spectrum of views on the debate [between religious liberty
and gay rights] and until one side abdicates or the Supreme Court takes up any
decisions, the conflict will remain unresolved." Id. at 1793-94.
81. City of Tampa's Human Rights Ordinance Chapter 12, §§ 12-61 to 12-68.
82. Public Accommodation, CITY OF TAMPA,
http://www.tampagov.net/
dept communityaffairs/programs and services/Public accommodation.asp
(last
visited Nov. 7, 2012).
83. Id.
84. Id.

85. Further, one may not:
Publish, circulate, issue, display, post, or mail any written or printed
communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that any of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of
any place of public accommodation shall be refused, withheld from, or
denied to any person, or that the patronage of any such person is
unwelcome, objectionable, or not acceptable, desired, or solicited.
Segregate any person at a place of public accommodation, or to segregate
any person in regards to the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation.
Intimidate, threaten, coerce or interfere, or attempt to intimidate, threaten,
coerce or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on
account of such person having aided or encouraged any other person in the
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D. Gay "Climate" by State: A Survey
1. Explanationof Chart
Each state has been categorized below with a grade of A through F in the
areas of law discussed above in an effort to gauge its general statewide
legal climate toward gay citizens.8 6 Following is the standard by which the
states were graded in each area and the ensuing chart (all letters were
converted to a 4.0 scale for averaging):
Marriage or relationship recognition: A (state allows same-sex
marriage); B (state enacted same-sex marriage but in flux, or state allows
civil unions/domestic partnerships); B- (state allows limited domestic
partnership laws); F (state grants no relationship rights).
Amendments to state constitutions or state-wide laws banning marriage:
A (no constitutional amendment or state law ban); C- (state law ban on
same-sex marriage); D (constitutional ban on same-sex marriage); D(constitutional ban on
same-sex marriage and civil unions); F
(constitutional ban on same-sex marriage, civil unions, and other
contracts).
Second parent adoption and custody/visitation rights: A (state allows
second-parent adoption); B (state passed law allowing second parent
adoption, but in flux); C (state law allows custody/visitation, and second
parent adoptions are allowed in some counties); C- (state does not allow or
has not addressed second-parent adoption, but state law allows
custody/visitation); D (state does not allow or has not addressed secondparent adoption, and state law has not addressed custody/visitation); F
(state expressly does not allow second-parent adoption, adoption by samenegative
law
regarding
couples,
or
has
recent
sex
adoption/custody/visitation).
Anti-discrimination laws (includes housing, employment and public
accommodation): A (state has discrimination laws protecting gay citizens
in the public sector and the private sector); C (state has discrimination laws
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by law.
Id.
86. This data was compiled using the following sources: LGBT Basic Rights and
Liberties, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/lgbt-basic-rightsand-liberties (last visited Nov. 7, 2012); Non-discrimination Laws: State by State
Information-Map, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/
maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map; NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN
RIGHTS, LGBT RECOGNITION OF LGBT FAMILIES 1, 3-5 (2012), available at
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/LegalRecognition ofLGBT Families.pdf
?doclD=2861; NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF LAWS REGARDING
SAME-SEX COUPLES (2012), available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/
Relationship Recognition State Laws Summary.pdf?doclD=6841; In Your State,
LAMBDA LEGAL, http://laiibdalegal.orglstates-regions (lasted visited Nov. 7, 2012).
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protecting gay citizens in the public sector but not the private sector); F
(state has no discrimination laws protecting gay citizens). Note the use of
three grades rather than five for this category because of the complexity of
evaluating anti-discrimination laws.

State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

Marriage
or
Relationship
Recognition
F
F
F
F
B
BA
B
F
F
B
F
B
F
A
F
F
F
A
A
A
F
F
F
F
F
F
B

Amendment or
Law
Banning
Same-Sex
Marriage
DD
D
DD
D
A
CDDD
DCCA
DDDA
A
A
F
CD
A
D
DD

Second
Parent
Adoption,
Custody &
Visitation

Anti-discrimination
Laws

Overall
Score

C
C
CCA
A
A
A
C87
C
A
D
A
A
A
D
F
C
A
A
A
C
C
F
C
CCA

F
F
C
F
A
A
A
A
F
F
A
F
A
C
A
C
C
F
A
A
A
C
F
A
C
C
F
A

F
DD
F
B
BA
B+
F
DB
CB+
CA
DDDA
A
A
D
D
D
C
D
F
B

87. Until recently, Florida was the only state in the nation that, by law, did not
permit adoption by homosexuals: "No person eligible to adopt under this statute [the
Florida Adoption Act] may adopt if that person is a homosexual." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.042 (LexisNexis 2012). A Florida court of appeals court has declared the law
unconstitutional. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. In re Adoption of X.X.G.,
45 So.3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), although the law still appears on the books.
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2. Analysis of Chart
Several observations can be made about these overall scores. First, and
perhaps most obviously, those states where same-sex marriage is allowed
clearly have the best legal climate for gay citizens. With marriage comes
an umbrella of state rights, including the ability to take advantage of state
tax benefits, inheritance and intestacy laws, wrongful death claims,
property laws, and a litany of parental rights, to name a few.88 Even states
that attempt to emulate marriage with civil unions and domestic partnership
benefits often fall short of doing so, despite their best attempts, because of

88. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 942 (Mass.

2003), for a detailed and illustrative list. "The benefits accessible only by way of a
marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death. The
department states that 'hundreds of statutes' are related to marriage and to marital
benefits." Id. at 955.
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the enormity of the comparison." Those states, however, are still to be
lauded for their efforts toward the marriage dimension and the climate they
have created in which other legal initiatives can perhaps move more easily
forward.
Interestingly, the area where most states have approved of state-wide gay
rights initiatives seems to be in the parental rights realm, where courts,
even in states such as North Carolina, have recognized the rights of samesex couples to share custody, albeit not as legal parents. 90 This suggests
that when courts are considering "the best interests of the child," they are
no longer viewing gay parents as a detriment in those states. 91 One could
hope that as more gay individuals have children, and as these children grow
up to become adults, numbers will dictate that this particular climate will
only continue to get better for gay citizens over time.
Finally, as is reflected in the chart above, most Americans do agree that
gay people should not be subject to "discrimination," even though many
Americans do not "agree" with same-sex marriage. For example, after
California passed Proposition 8 in 2008, outlawing same-sex marriage, the
Mormon Church was criticized for its support of the measure. 9 2 Yet, a year
later, the church openly supported a Salt Lake City local ordinance banning

89. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 422 (Cal. 2008). The argument was
made that domestic partners had the same rights as those who could marry; the court
noted, "Although the governing statutes provide that registered domestic partners have
the same substantive legal rights and are subject to the same obligations as married
spouses, in response to a request for supplemental briefing by this court the parties
have identified various differences (nine in number) that exist in the corresponding
provisions of the domestic partnership and marriage statutes and in a few other
statutory and constitutional provisions." Id. at 416 n.24. The court then went on to
discuss those differences.
90. See Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 504-05 (N.C. 2010) (dismissing
second-parent adoption but affirming the court of appeals case law finding that the nonbiological parent could be granted custody rights, noting "[biological mother] shared
parental responsibilities with [non-biological mother] and, when occurring in the
family unit [biological mother] created without any expectation of termination, acted
inconsistently with her paramount parental status .

. .

. [B]ecause defendant has acted

inconsistently with her paramount parental status, the trial court did not err by
employing the 'best interest of the child' standard to reach its custody decision.").
91. In North Carolina, for example, the "best interest of the child" standard is
codified by statute: "An order for custody of a minor child entered pursuant to this
section shall award the custody of such child to such person, agency, organization or
institution as will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. In making the
determination, the court shall consider all relevant factors including acts of domestic
violence between the parties, the safety of the child, and the safety of either party from
domestic violence by the other party and shall make findings accordingly. An order for
custody must include findings of fact which support the determination of what is in the
best interest of the child." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (West 2012).
92. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson,
Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l1/15/us/politics/1 5marriage.html?pagewanted=all&_r-

0.
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discrimination against gay men and lesbians in housing and employment. 9 3
According to The New York Times, "[i]n its statement backing the
ordinance, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints said that while it
remained 'unequivocally committed to defending the bedrock foundation
of marriage between a man and a woman,' the question of how people were
treated on the job and in finding places to live were matters of fairness that
did not have anything to do with marriage." 94 Polling shows that an
overwhelming majority of Americans support these types of
antidiscrimination policies in the workplace. 95 However, specific polling
as to housing discrimination or places of public accommodation are often
lumped into questions asking about "discrimination" in general, and as a
result, conclusions cannot be made about the view of the public as to these
specific areas.
IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES

Having examined the workings of local legal authority in Part II and gay
legal rights (further compared with a state's "gay legal climate") in Part III,
this Part explores ways that elected officials wishing to effectuate change in
their local jurisdictions can balance their degree of local authority with the
climate of gay legal rights in the particular state in which they are located.
For example, if one lives in a state that prohibits same-sex marriage in its
constitution, has no case law on second parent adoption, and has no statewide public accommodation laws covering sexual orientation, one would
normally surmise that trying to pass a local law addressing an area of gay
rights might not be successful. However, if the town is located in a home
rule state, a high degree of legal authority might still be available to
implement such initiatives. If the town is not located in a home rule state,
its authority is more limited, but there are still ways to effectuate change
while balancing political realities.
Communities run the gamut from localities that already have substantial
gay rights laws in place (usually larger cities) to those that have none at all.
In considering local initiatives that are permissible by operation of law,
elected officials need to weigh a number of factors, including support from
fellow council members, buy-ins from the town manager and staff, as well
as the climate of the community. In many towns across the United States,
there are no local laws or policies addressing gay legal issues simply
because no one on the council or board has addressed the issue.
Generally, these laws or policies are considered at the local level
93. See Kirk Johnson, Mormon Support of Gay Rights Statute Draws Praise,N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/us/12utah.html.

94. Id.
95. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 54.
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because: a gay citizen or group of citizens come forward with a selfinitiated proposal for the council or board to consider; there are employers
or businesses in the town that have initiated gay-friendly legal policies, and
someone wants the council or board to consider these for the town;
someone moves to town and is astounded that there are no such policies in
place and asks the town to consider such policies or laws; town staff or
elected officials go to conferences where they learn about various
initiatives that the town could undertake to address legal issues facing gay
persons; or a gay person gets elected and takes a look at proposed
ordinances and policies with a "new eye." 96
This section discusses the following areas of local governmental gay
legal rights initiatives in the context of local authority: discrimination laws,
domestic partner benefits, local contractor laws, and the passage of
resolutions by a governing body. Examples of each illustrate the
challenges of implementing these policies at the local level.
A. Local DiscriminationLaws

A majority of the United States population supports anti-discrimination
laws that include gay people; thus, this is a fairly straightforward initiative
that most towns can take with a high degree of success. 97 These initiatives
can be undertaken in towns or cities that have proper local legal authority
and where there is not already a state law in place. Indeed, if enough towns
or cities in a state pass such laws, it gives greater support with which to
urge state lawmakers to follow a similar course at a state level. This is
what is happening in the state of Utah, where municipalities have some
96. Electing openly gay officials is a proven method of getting these types of laws
and policies passed. The Gay & Lesbian Victory Fund, which works to elect LGBT
leaders to public office, exists solely to support such efforts: "Lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender office holders are our clearest and most convincing champions for true
equality. As leaders in government, they become the face and voice of a community.
They challenge the lies of extremists and speak authentically about themselves, their
families and their community." Mission, THE GAY & LESBIAN VICTORY FUND,
http://www.victoryfund.org/our story/mission (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
97. The most high profile case regarding such an initiative is Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, several municipalities in Colorado had passed ordinances
giving protection to persons discriminated against by reason of their sexual orientation,
resulting in "Amendment 2" to the Colorado Constitution prohibiting such laws. Id. at
623-24. Upon challenge, the United States Supreme Court ruled that such action was
unconstitutional, holding in this landmark case that "[f]irst, the amendment has the
peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group, an exceptional and . . . invalid form of legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests." Id. at 632. The Court continued: "Amendment 2 ... is at
once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies
them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons
from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our
jurisprudence." Id. at 633.
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limited degree of autonomy. 9 8 In April 2012, the city council in
Springdale, Utah (population 529) passed an anti-discrimination ordinance
addressing employment and housing based on sexual orientation, becoming
the fifteenth locality in Utah to do so; business leaders in Utah would like
state legislators to follow suit and have made their position known
publicly. 99 Passing these types of laws typically means simply adding the
new protected category to already existing discrimination laws, thus
requiring a minimum of drafting effort. These existing laws should already
outline basic conduct that constitutes discrimination, how to report
complaints, and other procedural details.
One can run into a roadblock, however, if one is not found to have the
proper legal authority to pass such an ordinance. This can happen for
various reasons, such as the entity's authority not being covered under
limited-home rule, preemption, or other constitutional grounds. Such was
the result in the North Carolina case of Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield
ofNorth Carolina.iOo

1. Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina
Although the Williams case dealt with a county (not a city or town) that
tried to implement an antidiscrimination ordinance, it is instructive just the
same. As background to the Williams case, the Orange County (North
Carolina) Board of Commissioners (BOCC), in 1987, established a Human
Relations Committee (HRC) pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes
§ 160A-492, which stated, "The governing body of any city, town, or
county is hereby authorized to undertake ... human relations, community
action and manpower development programs ... [and] may appoint such
human relations, community action and manpower development
committees or boards and citizens' committees, as it may deem necessary
in carrying out such programs and activities."'o The charge from the
BOCC to the HRC was that it:
(1) study and make recommendations concerning problems in the field of

98. Cities and towns in Utah are granted home rule in many, but not all, areas of
lawmaking. UTAH CONST. art. IX § V.
99. See Non-discriminationOrdinancePassesin Springdale,NEWS UTAH (Apr. 19,

2012), http://www.newsutah.org/utah/non-discrimination-ordinance-passes-springdale14924/; Denis Romboy, Top Utah Business Executives Call for Statewide
Nondiscrimination Law, DESERET NEWS
(Jan.
26
2012,
8:04
PM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705398160/Top-Utah-business-executives-callfor-statewide-nondiscrimination-law.html?pg-all;
see
also
Nondiscrimination
Ordinances, EQUALITY UTAH, http://www.equalityutah.org/nondiscrimination (last

visited Oct. 22, 2012) (listing all of the towns and cities).
100. Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 581 S.E.2d. 415, 431-32 (N.C.
2003).
101. Id. at 419.
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human relationships; (2) anticipate and discover practices and customs
most likely to create animosity and unrest and to seek solutions to
problems as they arise; (3) make recommendations designed to promote
goodwill and harmony among groups in the County irrespective of their
race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, affectional
preference, disability, age, marital status, or status with regard to public
assistance; (4) monitor complaints involving discrimination; (5) address
and attempt to remedy the violence, tensions, polarization, and other
harm created through the practices of discrimination, bias, hatred, and
civil inequality; and (6) promote harmonious relations within the county
through hearings and due process of law .... 102
After the HRC conducted several public hearings, it recommended to the
BOCC that Orange County establish a comprehensive civil rights
ordinance, and include sexual orientation as a protected category.1'0 The
North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation in 1991 allowing
Orange County to do this.104 Two years later, the Orange County
legislative delegation asked the North Carolina General Assembly to pass
enabling legislation that modified what had passed previously, and which
more closely mirrored federal and state law by dropping sexual orientation
from the list of protected groups. 05 This was passed, and a year later the
BOCC adopted the ordinance. 06 The next year, more laws were passed
authorizing transfer by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(for employment discrimination complaints) and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (for housing discrimination complaints)
to Orange County for complaints that arose in the county. 0 7
When plaintiff Mary Williams brought an employment discrimination
action under the Orange County Civil Rights Ordinance, the HRC found
that there was reasonable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred
due to her race and gender, and the HRC issued a "right to sue" letter. 08
After the suit commenced, however, defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of
North Carolina (BCBS) asked for a declaratory judgment that the enabling
legislation and the ordinance violated Article II, Section 24 of the North
Carolina Constitution.109 The applicable provision is titled "Limitations on
local, private, and special legislation" and reads as follows: "(1) Prohibited
subjects. The General Assembly shall not enact any local, private, or
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 420.
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 421-22.
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(j) Regulating labor, trade, mining, or
manufacturing[.] ... (3) Prohibited acts void. Any local, private, or special
act or resolution enacted in violation of the provisions of this Section shall
be void.""10 Orange County and the HRC (counterclaim defendants)
argued that neither the enabling legislation nor the ordinance was a local
act under Article II, Section 24 but that even if the court determined that
the enabling legislation and the ordinance were local acts, they were not
prohibited local acts because they sought to regulate discrimination, rather
than labor or trade.' 1
The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected these arguments, holding,
upon application of the reasonable classification test, that the ordinance
was a local act and, thus, prohibited.1 2 The court noted that there was
nothing special about employment rights in Orange County that made it
necessary for employees who lived there to have their own scheme for
recompense, one which differed from that covering everyone else in the
state. 113 The court also noted that the ordinance contained two categories
of protection not found elsewhere in the state: familial status and veteran's
status. 114 In discussing its reasoning, the court went through the history
behind the drafting of the "special act" provision of the North Carolina
Constitution.' 5
The court found that the Article II Section 24 process was not followed.
It refused to uphold the particularized laws in the present case, fearing that
they would lead to the creation of "a patchwork of standards varying from
special act or resolution: . ..

110. N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 24(1)(j), (3).
111. Williams, 581 S.E.2d at 425.
112. Id. at 426 ("Under a reasonable classification analysis, 'the distinguishing
factors between a valid general law and a prohibited local act are the related elements
Legislative classification of
of reasonable classification and uniform application.'
conditions, persons, places, or things is reasonable when it is 'based on [a] rational
difference of situation or condition."'); id. at 430 (explaining that the court expressed
no opinion as to whether Orange County had the authority to address the housing and
public accommodation issues under the Ordinance).
113. Id. at 427-28 (noting that the statute of limitations period was different for these
type of discrimination claims in Orange County than it was in other counties).
114. Id. at 427.
115. "The organic law of the State was originally drafted and promulgated by a
convention which met at Halifax in December, 1776. During the ensuing 140 years,
the Legislature of North Carolina possessed virtually unlimited constitutional power to
enact local, private, and special statutes. This legislative power was exercised with
much liberality, and produced a plethora of local, private, and special enactments. As
an inevitable consequence, the law of the State was frequently one thing in one locality,
and quite different things in other localities. To minimize the resultant confusion, the
people of North Carolina amended their Constitution at the general election of 1916 so
as to deprive their Legislature of the power to enact local, private, or special acts or
resolutions relating to many of the most common subjects of legislation." Id. at 42627.
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county to county."" 6
As to counterclaim defendants' argument that the action being regulated
was discrimination, not labor, the court stated that by covering employment
discrimination, the ordinance had the "practical effect" of regulating labor,
and trade as well."' Counterclaim defendants tried a final argument that
the passage of the ordinance fell under authority given to them under the
county "general welfare" clause of the North Carolina General Statutes, but
this argument failed."' 8 The court emphasized throughout the opinion that
they were "addressing only the employment discrimination provisions" of
the ordinance, not housing or public accommodation, and that they
expressed "no opinion as to whether Orange County possessed inherent
authority to address these areas."ll 9
Analyzing Williams, one can surmise that the county thought that it had
the authority to pass the ordinance and that they may even have modified it
in 1993 by eliminating "sexual orientation" as a protected category to make
it more defensible if it was challenged. In a non home-rule state, the
county must have believed its authority to pass the ordinance derived from
the "general welfare" clause of the North Carolina General Statutes.
However, this case underscores the importance of carefully examining
one's state constitution to determine if there are any roadblocks to local
legislation. In this case, it appears that even the North Carolina General
Assembly (where presumably the legal staff studied the proposed
legislation) did not view the ordinance as a "special act." Although this
case ultimately did not include sexual orientation as one of the categories
that the ordinance would protect, it still serves as an example of how local
government should carefully proceed when considering such legislation. In
this case, a ruling that could perhaps have been anticipated by a
constructionist court nullified years of effort.
Another reality of implementing laws at the local level is obtaining the
necessary buy-in from one's local legislative delegation if it is one that
requires enabling authority; an illustration of this occurred in the Williams
116. Id. at 428.
117. Id. at 429.

118. Id. at 430 & n.4. Counterclaim defendants cited § 153A-121(a) in support of
this argument, which gives a county the power to enact ordinances that "define,

regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions detrimental to the health,
safety, or welfare of its citizens and the peace and dignity of the county." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 153A-121(a)(2001). Defendants also unsuccessfully argued that the following
statutes gave them authority to pass the ordinance: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-174 (2001)
("The fact that a State or federal law, standing alone, makes a given act, omission, or
condition unlawful shall not preclude city ordinances requiring a higher standard of
conduct or condition."), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2001) ("Broad construction"),
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-123 (2001) ("Enforcement of ordinances"), and N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 153A-134 (2001) ("Regulating and licensing businesses, trades, etc.").
119. Williams, 581 S.E.2d. at 430.
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case. In limited or non-home rule states, a local legislator can introduce
local bills to a statewide legislature to accomplish local goals. One North
Carolina commentator has noted the pros and cons of this approach:
"Where the authority of a particular act is not clear, local governments may
seek special legislation passed by the state legislature-a local act-to
provide clear authority. Local governments also regularly seek special
legislation in order to modify specific constitutional limitations contained
in the general law."' 20 Despite constitutional limitations, it is easy to obtain
local acts, especially those that have the support of the local legislation.
Under a courtesy system, the general assembly usually approves local acts

unanimously.121
The local act system provides for the creation of a pilot program,
allowing local jurisdictions to authorize new programs or activities before
statewide acceptance. "On the other hand, the legislative landscape that
shapes local authority is made somewhat more complicated by the presence
of local legislation that modifies authority for one or more units through
uncodified provisions." 2 2 Local acts create the fear that a particular power
does not exist in general law.
While this courtesy system usually works as explained above, with
"controversial" issues this is often not the case. An attempt by the
Carrboro (North Carolina) Board of Aldermen to amend its town charter
housing antidiscrimination authority to include sexual orientation was
killed in committee at the North Carolina General Assembly, despite the
support of the local delegation.12 3
B. Domestic PartnerBenefits

Once heralded as the most progressive way a local government could
demonstrate its forward thinking with regard to benefits for gay employees,
domestic partner benefits (specifically in this discussion, health insurance
benefits), while still better than nothing, remain problematic for a number
of reasons. First and foremost, one of the many problems with domestic
partner benefits is that without the benefit of marriage the "imputed value"
of any benefit is fully taxed to the employee.124 After running the numbers,
employees who wish to provide insurance coverage for their partners
120. Bluestein, supra note 17, at 2009-10.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. This occurred after a tirade of fear mongering by the co-chair of the committee,
who was also the House minority chair at the time. See Lydia Lavelle, Not in This
House, CARRBORO CITIZEN (May 7, 2009), http://www.carrborocitizen.com/main/
2009/05/07/not-in-this-house (giving an editorial about this local bill).
124. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-21(b)(1) (specifying how "fringe benefits" are to be
valued for purposes of calculating an employee's gross income).
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through domestic partner benefits often find that it simply does not make
financial sense.125 Just as forward-thinking companies have looked to
create tax offsets to address this domestic partner benefit disparity,12 6
forward-thinking local governments should follow suit, and at least one has
done so.1 27
Two areas of concern that need to be discussed with regard to domestic
partner benefits are: (1) initially offering domestic partner benefits and, (2)
once obtained, how to retain these benefits. Concentrating on the first
question, there are many local jurisdictions that offer these types of
benefits, even in states that have "marriage amendments" and/or limited
home rule.12 8 Therefore, the presence of a marriage amendment or the
absence of total home rule authority should not dissuade an eager
councilperson from proposing these benefits. There are many models
around the country available for reference. Note, however, as the next case
shows, that there is at least one jurisdiction (a county) where domestic
partner benefits in a non-home rule and later "marriage amendment" state
did not pass muster once legally challenged.
1. Arlington County v. White
In the 1997 case of Arlington County v. White,12 9 the county decided to
expand the list of persons eligible for coverage under the county's selffunded health insurance benefits plan to include adult, dependent domestic
partners of employees.
When legally challenged by taxpayers, the
Supreme Court of Virginia first noted that "' [t]he General Assembly
specifically authorizes a local government to provide self-funded health
125. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Cambridge, Mass., Equalizes Cost of Health
Insurance for Gay Workers, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2011, 3:30 PM),
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/cambridge-mass-equalizes-cost-of-healthinsurance-for-gay-workers/ [hereinafter Bernard, Cost of Health Insurance]; see also
Tax Parity for Health Beneficiaries Act of 2011, H.R. 2088, 112th Cong. (2012); Tax
Parity for Health Plan Beneficiaries Act of 2011, S. 1117, 112th Cong. (2012)
(introducing a bill in both the House and the Senate that would address this tax
disparity).
126. Bernard, A ProgressReport, supra note 66, at 1-2.
127. See Bernard, Cost ofHealth Insurance,supra note 125.
128. For example, Florida (which has a marriage amendment and limited home rule)
has several cities that provide domestic partner benefits, including Orlando, St. Cloud,
and Kissimmee. See John Busdeker, St. Cloud Makes Domestic-Partner Health
Benefits Available to City Employees, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Sept. 9, 2011),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-09-09/health/os-domestic-partner-benefits-stcloud-20110909 1 domestic-partner-domestic-partners-city-employees;
see
also
Jeremy Pittman, Domestic PartnerBenefits on Both Sides of the Ohio River, HRC
BLOG (May 14, 2011), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/domestic-partner-benefits-onboth-sides-of-the-ohio-river.
Ohio has a marriage amendment and home rule;
Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus are among Ohio cities offering domestic partner
benefits.
129. Arlington Cnty. v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706, 707 (Va. 2000).
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benefit programs for its employees and their dependents."" 30 Lacking a
statutory definition for the term "dependent," the court further noted the
lack of an express statutory provision allowing employee dependents to
participate in a locality's self-funded health benefits plans.' 3 '
Under these circumstances, the County correctly maintains, "[t]he power
to determine who is an employee's dependent . . . is fairly and

necessarily implied." Furthermore, the County asserts, "the locality must
make [the] determination itself'; indeed, it "could not carry out its
authority without exercising its discretion." In the process, the County
submits, the term "dependent" should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning as one "[r]elying on . .. the aid of another for support." 32
The court, however, determined that by enacting the ordinance, the
county had violated Dillon's Rule.13 3 In determining that the ordinance
violated the Dillon Rule, the court cited a 1997 attorney general opinion
that stated "the statutory scheme which permits local governments 'to
provide for their officers and employees [self-funded] group life, accident,
and health insurance programs ... [does not] contain any language from
which a general legislative intent to extend insurance coverage
to persons
34
within the definition of 'domestic partner' may be inferred.""1
After discussing Dillon's rule, the attorney general opined that "[i]n the
absence of any statutory authority indicating an intent to permit a local
governing body to extend health insurance coverage provided employees to
persons other than the spouse, children or dependents of the employee . .. a
county lacks the power to provide such coverage."135 Specifically, the
established definition of "dependant" is contradicted by the requirement
that the employee be "financially interdependent" with the domestic
partner. 3 6
The court concluded that the offering of the benefits to domestic partners
was an ultra vires act.' 3 7 The dissent argued that the real issue in the case
was whether "Arlington County [had] the legal authority to recognize
common law marriages or 'same-sex unions' by conferring certain health
130. Id. at 708 (citing VA CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-1517(A), 51.1-801).
131. Id.

132. Id. (footnotes and citation omitted).
133. See id. ("For the reasons that follow and giving the County the benefit of any
doubt, we conclude that the County's definition of dependent is not reasonable and,
therefore, violates the Dillon Rule.").
134. Id. at 708-09.
135. Id. at 709.
136. See id. (noting that the established definition of "dependent" is one in which the
individual "receive[s] from the taxpayer over half of his or her support for the calendar
year").
137. See id An ultra vires act is "an act performed without any authority to act on
the subject." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990).
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insurance benefits upon domestic partners of County employees who are
engaged in these relationships." 38 While this argument in Arlington v.
White seems off-base, it unfortunately laid the groundwork for future
litigation elsewhere involving the continued existence of domestic partner
benefits. Recent cases challenging domestic partner benefits have taken
place in Michigan and Arizona, and are worthy of examination.
2. National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan
In 2004, Michigan passed a marriage amendment.' 39 When the
amendment was passed, "several public employers, including state
universities and various city and county governments, had policies or
agreements in effect that extended health-insurance benefits to their
employees' qualified same-sex domestic partners."14 0 After the attorney
general's office issued a formal opinion that the amendment barred the
offering of such benefits, plaintiffs (National Pride at Work, Inc., a
nonprofit organization of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations, as well as employees of the city of Kalamazoo,
Michigan, and other educational, state, and county public entities) filed a
declaratory judgment action against the Governor in National Pride at
Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, asking if the marriage amendment

"bar[red] public employers from providing health-insurance benefits to
their employees' qualified same-sex domestic partners."'41
In National Pride at Work, Inc., the trial court held for the plaintiffs,

reasoning that the provision of health benefits did not "constitute one of the
'benefits of marriage."' 4 2 The court reasoned that the "criteria [used by
the public employers] also do not recognize a union 'similar to marriage"'
because the "criteria, even when taken together, pale in comparison to the
myriad of legal rights and responsibilities accorded to those with marital
status." 43
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the amendment "precludes
recognition of a 'similar union for any purpose,"' and, therefore, a
domestic partnership will still violate the amendment even though it does
not mirror every aspect of marriage. 144 First, the relationship between the

138.
part).
139.
2008).
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

White, 528 S.E.2d at 710-11 (Hassell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Mich.
Id.
Id. at 529-30.
Id. at 530.
Id.
See id.
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employee and domestic partner still creates a union the employer would be
legally obligated to recognize and for which an employer must provide
benefits. Second, the employee is required to provide proof of the
domestic partnership in order to receive benefits from their employers. 14 5
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Michigan
Court of Appeals, examining domestic partner benefits policies from
Kalamazoo and other entities, including a domestic partner registry from
Ann Arbor, Michigan. 14 6 In its reasoning, the court focused on the words
of the amendment: "To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our
society and for future generations of children, the union of one man and
one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a
marriage or similar union for any purpose." 1 47 The court then went about
asking "whether the public employers are recognizing a domestic
partnership as a union similar to a marriage." 4 8 Examining the definition
of a "union," the court declared that a domestic partnership was "most
certainly a union." 4 9 It also determined that a domestic partnership was
similar to a marriage and that the court was recognizing a domestic
partnership as a union similar to marriage because of the provision of
"health-insurance benefits on the basis of the partnership."150 Finally, the
court examined the "for any purpose" amendment language to resolve any
"residual doubt" about whether a public entity could offer domestic partner
benefits, noting that "the people of this state could hardly have made their
intentions clearer."' 5 ' The majority justices made it clear that the
amendment language in the Michigan statute served as the basis for their
decision and that it was, therefore, not helpful to look at case law from
52
other states because other amendments would be worded differently.1
Justice Kelly disagreed with the majority, stating in her dissent that the
amendment merely prohibits the recognition of same-sex marriages or
similar unions. "It is a perversion of the amendment's language to
conclude that, by voluntarily offering the benefits at issue, a public

145. See id. at 533 ("The requirement that an employee either of a written domesticpartnership agreement or an agreement between the employee and the dependent to be
jointly responsible for basic living and household expenses, in order to establish by the
partner or dependent for insurance coverage, constitutes recognition by the public
employer of a 'similar union for any purpose."').
146. Id. at 532 n.2.
147. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25.
148. Nat'l Prideat Work, 748 N.W.2d at 533.
149. Id. at 534.

150. Id. at 533, 537.
151. Id. at 538.
152. Id. at 542-43.
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employer recognizes a union similar to marriage."'5 She went on to study
the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the amendment, noting that
Michigan voters clearly had not meant to prevent public employers from
offering healthcare benefits to the "same-sex partners" of their
employees.' 5 4 Justice Kelly was referencing the fact (undisputed, and in
the record) that Citizens for the Protection of Marriage, the organization
primarily responsible for supporting the passage of the amendment, had
widely publicized that the amendment's passage would not affect the
offering of domestic partner benefits for public employees.'5 5 She further
emphasized that the amendment was "only about marriage."s And, as the
majority did, Justice Kelly examined the precise language of the
amendment, drawing a different conclusion.' 57
The Michigan case is the direst example to date of the effect that a
marriage amendment can have on a local government's ability to offer
domestic partner benefits, but the governor of Arizona is currently seeking
a similar outcome in her state.
3. Diaz v. Brewer
On July 2, 2012, Arizona's attorney general filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in Diaz v. Brewer on behalf of the governor in the United States
Supreme Court, asking the Court to overturn a ruling by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals that, despite the passage of a marriage amendment, the
state of Arizona must continue to offer domestic partner benefits to its
employees who wish to cover same-sex partners.
At the district court level, the trial judge denied defendants' motion to
dismiss and granted a preliminary injunction which kept the benefits in
place while the case continued.159 In denying the motion to dismiss, the
153. Id. at 544 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
154. Id. ("The majority decision does not represent 'the law which the people have
made, [but rather] some other law which the words of the constitution may possible be
made to express."').
155. Id. at 546; see also Tom Szczesny, Controversial Gay MarriageBan on Ballot,
MICH. DAILY (Sept. 27, 2004), http://www.michigandaily.com/content/controversialgay-marriage-ban-ballot (noting that the proposed amendment to the Michigan
constitution did not affect existing benefits packages and contracts).
156. Nat'l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 547 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
157. Id at 549-51.
158. See Yvonne Wingett Sanchez & D.S. Woodfill, Gov. Jan Brewer Asks Supreme
Court to Hear Benefits' Case, THE REPUBLIC (July 9, 2012, 09:07 PM),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/2012/07/09/20120709gov-jan-brewerasks-supreme-court-hear-benefits-case.html (discussing Governor Brewer's opposition
to healthcare benefits for same-sex partners of state employees and her appeal to the
United States Supreme Court); see also Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.
2011), reh'g en banc denied, 676 F.3d 823 (9th Cir.), petitionfor cert.filed, No. 12-23,
2012 WL 2645111 (U.S. July 2, 2012).
159. Diaz, 656 F.3d at 1012.
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court found that the statute had a discriminatory effect as it allowed
different-sex couples to maintain their health coverage while denying the
same benefit to same-sex couples. 160 Because of the discriminatory effect
of the amendment, the district court granted the plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction. 16 1
At the Circuit Court of Appeals, Governor Brewer advanced three
arguments for why the granting of a preliminary injunction by the district
court was not proper; these arguments were rejected. 162 When determining
that the granting of the preliminary injunction was proper, the Court of
Appeals noted that the district court "applied the appropriate standards,
looking first at the likelihood of success on the merits. It reviewed each of
the justifications for the law in light of the evidence in the record."l 6 3
Furthermore, the court focused on the fact that the amendment furthered
the state's economic interests through the reduction in expenditures.
However, the attorney general argued that the evidence presented at the
district level did not bear this out.' 6 4
The defendants, on appeal, also contended "that the district court's order
impermissibly recognized a constitutional right to healthcare."' 6 5 However,
the court found that this contention rests on a misconception of the district
court's decision because, although employees are not constitutionally
entitled to health benefits, the state may not provide health benefits in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner against "groups that may be

unpopular."'

66

A final argument Governor Brewer advanced was that "the statute
promotes marriage by eliminating benefits for domestic partners." 67
Instead, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that denying benefits to samesex partners cannot promote marriage since these persons cannot get
married. 68
160. Id.
161. See id (granting the injunction on equal protection grounds).
162. Id. at 1012-13.
163. Id. at 1013 (citation omitted).
164. Id
165. Id.
166. Id. The court went on to discuss U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973), which it said also involved an "arbitrary restriction of benefits for
a particular group perceived as unpopular." Id. The court noted that Moreno involved
"so-called 'hippies."' Id.
167. Id. at 1014.
168. Id. Thankfully, the court did not opine, as members of the judiciary have in
other opinions, that gay people can get married-they just need to marry someone of
the opposite sex. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 975
(Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting) ("[T]he marriage statutes do not discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation. . . . The marriage statutes do not disqualify individuals
on the basis of sexual orientation from entering into marriage. All individuals, with
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The unanimous ruling by the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the
United States District Court of Arizona's granting of a preliminary
injunction while the underlying case goes to trial, provides a bit of
encouragement to advocates of these types of governmental benefits.
Arizona, a state that is not particularly "legal-friendly" to gay rights, was
able to provide these state domestic partner benefits by virtue of an
executive order issued by the former governor Janet Napolitano. 69
Depending on the ultimate outcome of the case, same-sex couples may feel
the positive effects of the case throughout Arizona's state and local
government once the case reaches its conclusion.
Due, in particular, to the NationalPride at Work, Inc., case in Michigan,

public officials and legal rights advocates in North Carolina have been
concerned as to whether the recent passage of that state's marriage
amendment will affect domestic partner benefits currently offered to
employees by several local and county governments in the state.17 0 Indeed,
the morning after the May 8, 2012, primary election passed the
amendment, a commissioner in Mecklenburg County (where Charlotte, the
largest city in North Carolina is located) was asking staff for clarification
of the issue, with the intent of taking away the current benefits.'7 1
The official North Carolina amendment (also known as "Amendment
One") is actually longer than what voters read on their ballots on Election
Day.172 In its entirety, it reads:
certain exceptions not relevant here, are free to marry. Whether an individual chooses
not to marry because of sexual orientation or any other reason should be of no concern
to the court.").
169. See Sanchez & Woodfill, supra note 158.
170. See Diane M. Juffras, Amendment One, North CarolinaPublic Employers, and
Domestic PartnerBenefits, PUB. EMP. LAW BULL. (Univ. N.C. School of Gov't, Chapel
Hill, N.C.), June 2012, at 1, 18 (discussing the potential impact of Amendment One
and concluding that the Michigan case will not be persuasive in North Carolina); see
also Mary C. Curtis, North CarolinaSame-Sex MarriageAmendment: Confusion Over
Domestic Partnership Benefits, WASH. POST (May 18, 2012, 4:47 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/post/north-carolina-same-sexmarriage-amendment-confusion-over-domestic-partner-benefits/2012/05/18/gIQAKjhG
ZU blog.html (posting the day after Amendment One was passed in North Carolina on
the confusion caused by the language of the amendment); Robertson, supra note 43
(noting the vague and untested nature of the language of the amendment).
171. Specifically, Commissioner James asked, "Since Amendment One has passed,
when will we get a memo or something that outlines what changes we need to make to
our health plan to be in compliance? I recall when the Democrats on the Commission
forced the issue and added these benefits for homosexuals that a number of legal
experts said it was illegal then-including the city attorney. Now that Amendment
One has passed, it obviously is illegal to offer this benefit as there is now only one
'domestic legal union' recognized in the state." Curtis, supra note 170. James added,
"Prior to the vote, most scholars (left and right) said that Amendment One would
eliminate local faux 'marriage' benefits for homosexual employees." Id.
172. Juffras, supra note 170, at 18 (claiming only the first sentence of Amendment
One was printed on the North Carolina ballots).
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Marriage between one man and one woman is the only domestic legal
union that shall be valid or recognized in this State. This section does
not prohibit a private party from entering into contracts with another
private party; nor does this section prohibit courts from adjudicating the
rights of private parties pursuant to such contracts.173
One commentator, Diane Juffras, has recently written on the issue of
whether the amendment should affect the ability of local governments to
offer domestic partner benefits to its employees.174 In her view, these
public entities should still be able to offer these benefits because the
primary effect of Amendment One is that it invalidates any general statute
amending the marriage laws within North Carolina to include same-sex
marriage. However, Juffras notes a secondary effect as well.175 Juffras
states that Amendment One prohibits the General Assembly and local
governing boards from granting legal recognition to relationships between
same-sex couples, despite the fact that the phrase "domestic legal union" is
not defined in the amendment text. 76
Because of the authority given to local governments in North Carolina
under various statutes, Juffras explains that the offering of domestic partner
benefits should still be under the purview of local officials. Juffras outlined
the following reasons to bolster her opinion:
1. The North Carolina General Statutes give local government employers
the authority to purchase insurance and other benefits for their
employees and, in the case of municipalities, their dependents.
2. The General Statutes also give local governments the authority to
develop policies that will foster the hiring and retention of a capable and
diligent workforce.
3. Because the General Statutes themselves contain a rule of construction
instructing that the authority given to local governments is to be
construed broadly, it is reasonable to conclude that cities, counties, and
other local government entities could have chosen to offer domestic
partner benefits as a recruiting and retention tool.
4. Arguments that offering public employees domestic partner benefits
are contrary to state or federal law or to North Carolina public policy are
not suported by either North Carolina case law or case law from other
states.
173. Id. at 1.

174. Id. The UNC School of Government is "the largest university-based local
government training, advisory, and research organization in the United States," offering
"up to 200 courses, seminars, and specialized conferences for more than 12,000 public
Mission and History, UNC SCHOOL OF Gov'T,
officials each year."
http://www.sog.unc.edu/node/257 (last visited July 25, 2012). Members of the faculty
serve as resources for state and local governments across the state and beyond. Id.
175. Juffras, supra note 170, at 1.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2.
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Further arguments advanced by Juffras include the following: (1) the
amendment has a plain meaning on its face; (2) there is not a "legal
precedent in North Carolina or elsewhere for the proposition that a
government employer's coverage of its employees' domestic partners
under benefits plans makes valid or constitutes legal recognition of any
union or confers rights and responsibilities to any union under the law"
(i.e., that to "extend benefits is not to 'recognize' any kind of union"); and
(3) not allowing localities to offer domestic partner benefits could result in
federal or state equal protection violations.178 It remains to be seen if and
when someone might choose to challenge the offering of domestic partner
benefits by a local government in North Carolina in a court of law. 7 9
4. "Dependent" Challenges
Assuming a locality is able to offer domestic partner benefits, another
challenge has arisen in the context of employees who choose to cover a
child with health insurance.' 80 Specifically, this can occur when places of
employment offer domestic partner benefits that initially cover both a nonemployee partner and the couple's child but then the couple separates,
leaving the child without coverage. This problem can present under two
different scenarios.
The first scenario involves an examination of children "intended" of the
relationship. Depending on the state, without the benefit of marriage or
second-parent adoption, a child "intended" of the relationship can lose
coverage if the child is not a legal dependent of the employee. Here is how
this happens: town employee and partner (both female) decide to apply for
domestic partner benefits through the town's insurance provider because
their state does not allow same-sex marriage; in doing so, they affirm, by
affidavit, that they meet the required criteria. Employee and partner decide
178. Id. at 2-3.
179. An official explanation of the amendment when it was put on the ballot was
prepared by the Constitutional Amendments Publication Commission (comprised of the
North Carolina Secretary of State and Attorney General and the General Assembly's
Legislative Services Director) pursuant to law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 147-54.8-54.10
(2012). The Commission report noted that "[t]he term 'domestic legal union' used in
the amendment is not defined in North Carolina law. There is debate among legal
experts about how this proposed constitutional amendment may impact North Carolina
law as it relates to unmarried couples of same or opposite sex and same sex couples
legally married in another state, particularly in regard to employment-related benefits
for domestic partners; domestic violence laws; child custody and visitation rights; and
end-of-life arrangements. The courts will ultimately make those decisions." Juffras,
supra note 170, at 2.
180. Juffras, supra note 170, at 12 (noting concerns regarding the effect of
Amendment One on unmarried partners' ability to provide healthcare to their children,
especially for those who are civil employees (citing Laura Leslie, NC Marriage
Amendment:
What
It
Does,
WRAL
NEWS
(May
3,
2012),
http://www.wral.com/news/state/nccapitol/story/1 1060038)).
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to have a child and mutually agree that the non-employee partner will carry
the child, using an anonymous donor. Once born, the employee is unable
to adopt the child, because the two live in a state that does not allow
second-parent adoption. A few years later, the two break off their
relationship, and the partnership dissolves. In most cases, if the state is one
in which the two women could not marry or adopt through second-parent
adoption, the town employee can no longer carry the child on her town
insurance policy unless the child becomes her dependent.'8 ' Just as
forward-thinking companies have looked to create tax off-sets to address
the domestic partner benefit disparity,182 forward-thinking local
governments should identify ways to cover the non-biological child in this
situation, one which is extremely compelling as the town employee is still a
parent to the child. This might mean negotiating these specific terms with
the town's insurance provider and legitimizing coverage by having a town
employee and his/her partner sign an affidavit indicating that a child was
"intended" of the relationship.' 8 3
The second scenario is the consideration of situations in which children
come with the relationship. This is akin to stepchildren coming with a
marriage. When a marriage dissolves, the ability of a town employee
stepparent to cover his/her former stepchildren is usually no longer
available. However, the town employee stepparent, while married, at least
has the legal right to adopt the stepchild; therefore, if he/she and the
biological parent do get divorced, he/she can still carry the child on his/her
insurance. The domestic partner in a similar situation does not have the
option of adoption. As such, a longstanding relationship of in loco parentis
with a child might exist, but the stepparent would not be able to continue to
care for or support the child after a breakup with the child's biological
parent. 84 This discord is not as readily apparent as the earlier example
181. It is important to note that an employee who is married, has a child, and then
divorces can still carry his/her child on his/her health insurance, regardless of whether
the child is his/her "dependent."
182. See supra note 66 (discussing employers who reimburse gay employees a tax
off-set to equalize the disparity between domestic partner benefits and health insurance
coverage).
183. Such an affirmation might be more easily done at this stage than during a
"break-up" stage, where revisionist history can result in differing viewpoints of
whether the child was "intended" to be of the relationship. See Boseman v. Jarrell, 704
S.E.2d 494, 504-05 (N.C. 2010) (holding that a non-biological parent could be granted
custody rights as a result of her paramount parental status since the former couple
intentionally and voluntarily created a family unit into which they jointly decided to
bring a child).
184. See Shook v. Peavy, 23 N.C. App. 230, 232 (Ct. App. 1974) (defining in loco
parentis as one who stands in the place of a parent and who assumes "the status and
obligations of a parent without a formal adoption"); see also Duffey v. Duffey, 113
N.C. App. 382, 385 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that typically the status of in loco parentis
terminates upon divorce or the completion of the couple's relationship).
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where the child was "intended" by the relationship, but such a situation still
might be a place where local government can seek to negotiate terms with
the town's insurance company to allow stepparent domestic partners to
continue to cover their former stepchildren. The type of affidavit drafted
here might require a minimum period of time that the parental relationship
has existed (similar to most domestic partnership applications, which
require a minimum period of time of the relationship), 85 the agreement of
the biological parent (the ex-partner) for the town employee to provide
benefits, and other terms that would protect the town's long-term

interest.186
This "child benefits" problem is created, essentially, in states that do not
allow second-parent adoption.' 87 One might ask, is it really local
government's duty to "fill in the gaps" in these states in the absence of
second-parent adoption, which is a state issue? Working to provide
coverage for children of domestic partners whose relationships dissolve is a
prime example of how local government can at least address the health care
needs of children of same-sex couples.
C. Local ContractorLaws
One way that local governments can work to eradicate discrimination
against gay people is by way of contract. Governing bodies allocate and
spend a large amount of public money on projects, big and small. To get
the best deal for the public, when the project is over a certain amount of
money, these bodies typically solicit requests for proposals (RFPs) from
prospective vendors, based on specifications detailed in the bid
solicitation. 8 8 Many state governments have, in recent decades, sought to
increase participation by several underrepresented classifications of people

185. Domestic Partner Benefit Eligibility: Defining Domestic Partners and
Dependents, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/domesticpartner-benefit-eligibility-defining-domestic-partners-and-depende (last visited Feb. 20,
2013) (finding domestic partner affidavits require some proof that an "intimate,
committed relationship" existed for at least six months).
186. One example is if the biological parent entered into a new relationship or got
married and there was another partner/parent who could provide coverage, the option to
provide benefits might not be available.
187. Cf HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS: SECOND PARENT ADOPTION
(2011), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/parenting laws maps
%281%29.pdf (listing ten states plus the District of Columbia that allow second-parent
adoption statewide, including Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont). Only sixteen
states have successfully allowed same-sex couples to petition for second-parent
adoption. See id.
188. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-52 (2012) (requiring that bids are accepted based on
the best value for the public and conformity with the specifications and conditions in

the RFPs).
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in their bid process by the passage of special laws.189 Similarly, some local
governments have sought to increase protections for gay people by
reviewing the discrimination policies of vendors who contract for work
with the town or city.190 When legally able, these local governments are
requiring as part of their RFP process that prospective vendors either have
or commit to adopting discrimination policies that include gay persons.191
Several jurisdictions have successfully required that vendors contracting
with their city offer domestic partner benefits as part of their insurance
package to employees.192 These requirements can apply to all of a city's
contracts, or to contracts of a certain amount; in specified cases, there are
exceptions.1 93 Some require a pre-approval process before contracting with
a local government.194 There are many advantages to having these types of
local contractor laws.
These include the "proactive enforcement
mechanism" of these ordinances;19 5 the vendors' willingness to comply,
given possible drastic consequences;1 9 6 the added benefit that in many
cases the ordinance can reach outside of the geographic boundaries of the
local government that enacted the protections;' 97 and the reality that "it may
be legally, politically, and procedurally more feasible to pass these
ordinances than provisions that apply more broadly." 98 A disadvantage is
that the ordinances apply only to vendors that contract with the city, rather
than the private sector at large; additionally, the ordinances are most often
directed at contractors, rather than at providing individuals with rights and
remedies for violations of an ordinance.' 99
As with other ways that local governments can implement policies and
189. For example, North Carolina has such a statute, the policy being "to encourage
and promote the use of small contractors, minority contractors, physically handicapped
contractors, and women contractors in State purchasing of goods and services." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-48 (2012).
190. At least sixty-eight localities have adopted contractor requirements relating to
discrimination on the basis sexual orientation. See Christy Mallory & Brad Sears, An
Evaluation of Local Laws Requiring Government Contractorsto Adopt LGBT-Related
Workplace Policies,5 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 478, 481 (2012).
191. See id
192. Seventeen localities, as well as the State of California, have adopted an "Equal
Benefits Ordinance" (referred to as an EBO). See id. at 499. For a list of jurisdictions
that require their contractors to adopt "LGBT-related workplace policies," see id. at
483 n.14.
193. See id. at 487-92.
194. Id. at 492.
195. See id. at 506-08.
196. See id. at 508-09.
197. See id. at 509-10 (citing Air Transp. Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 992 F.
Supp. 1149, 1161-65 (N.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd, 266 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the reach of a EBO could go outside of the boundary of the locality)).
198. See id.at 511-12.
199. See id. at 514-15.
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laws that consider legal protections for gay people, these ordinances, if
challenged, may be preempted if states have already spoken on the subject,
even in home rule states. An example occurred in Council of New York v.

Bloomberg.200
1. Council of New York v. Bloomberg
The New York Court of Appeals held in Council of New York v.
Bloomberg that New York City's Equal Benefits Law was preempted by
state and federal statutes. 20 ' The Equal Benefits Law
provides, in substance, that no city agency may enter into contracts
having a value of $100,000 or more annually with any person or firm
that fails to provide to its employees' domestic partners employment
benefits equal to those provided to spouses. "Domestic partners," as
defined in the Equal Benefits Law, means people who are registered as
having that status under Administrative Code § 3-240(a), or who register
with a contractor pursuant to the Equal Benefits Law itself
(Administrative Code § 6-126[b][5]). "Employment benefits," as used in
the Equal Benefits Law, "means benefits including, but not limited to,
health insurance, pension, retirement, disability and life insurance,
family, medical, parental, bereavement and other leave policies, tuition
reimbursement, legal assistance, adoption assistance, dependent care
insurance, moving and other relocation expenses, membership or
membership discounts, and travel benefits provided by a contractor to its
employees" (Administrative Code § 6-126[b][7]). 202
The court noted in Bloomberg that under General Municipal Law § 103,
"all contracts for public work involving an expenditure of more than twenty
thousand dollars and all purchase contracts involving an expenditure of
more than ten thousand dollars, shall be awarded . .. to the lowest
responsible bidder .. ..
The court held that the Equal Benefits Law
violated the "lowest responsible bidder" requirement because it excluded
bidders that failed to provide benefits to domestic partners.204 Despite the
desirability of ensuring equal benefits for domestic partners, the court
stated that New York City could not violate the bidding statute to achieve
this end.205 Alluding to the state legislature, the court found that whether
the bidder's benefits plan meets the municipality's concept of fairness is
irrelevant under the competitive bidding statute, which requires
municipalities give business to the lowest responsible bidder-a
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See generally Council of N.Y.C. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 435.
Id.
Id. at 438.
Id

205. Id
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requirement designed to avoid favoritism. 2 0 6 The court also found that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a federal statute that
regulates employee benefit plans, largely preempted the ordinance.207
Laws and ordinances aside, local councils and boards can also work to
eradicate discrimination against gay persons by examining various agenda
items where contracts will be implemented and establishing policy
decisions to include nondiscrimination clauses where possible.
One
example relates to grants awarded by the town of Carrboro, North Carolina,
to various human services agencies. The Board of Aldermen requires
applicants to include LGBT nondiscrimination policies in their governing
documents. 2 0 8 The Board has a similar requirement for applicants seeking
monies from the Town's revolving loan fund.209
D. Resolutions

A resolution is, typically, a non-binding, official statement passed by a
majority of a board or council that declares a position or agreed upon
decision. 2 10 This method of advocacy, while often seen as toothless, can be
effective in some instances. In at least one case, a board passing a
resolution on an issue involving gay rights landed the governing city and
county in court, albeit briefly.

206. Id. The Council argued that the ordinance should be treated similarly to
"project labor agreements" (PLA), the subject of an earlier New York case. See
generally In re N.Y. State Chapter, Inc., Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. N.Y. State
Thruway Auth., 666 N.E.2d 185 (N.Y. 1996). PLAs provide "that bidders for public
construction contracts must sign pre-negotiated labor agreements or be barred from
bidding." Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d at 439. The Bloomberg court distinguished the
ruling in New York State Chapter, noting that there, they "held that the resulting
'efficiencies to be gained' might justify a PLA under the competitive bidding laws ...
only if it 'had as its purpose and likely effect the advancement of the interests
embodied in the competitive bidding statutes,' which [the court] identified as 'prudent
use of public moneys and . . . the acquisition of high quality goods and services at the

lowest possible cost."' Id. (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 440.
208. See JUNE 5, 2012 MINUTES, CARRBORO BD. OF ALDERMEN (2012), available at

http://www.ci.carrboro.nc.us/boa/Minutes/2012/06

05 2012.pdf (noting that "all future

Human Services Advisory Commission budget allocated contracts will include the
Town's nondiscrimination clause," specifically the language for LGBT protection).
209. See FEB. 21, 2012 MINUTES, CARRBORO BD. OF ALDERMEN (2012),
http://www.townofcarrboro.org/boa/Minutes/2012/02 21 2012.pdf.
210. See Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 567
F.3d 595, 606-08 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Board of Supervisors has passed
numerous non-binding resolutions "denouncing discrimination against gays and
lesbians," which enact no policy or regulations, but, instead, simply state the Board's
position).
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1. Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City of San Francisco
In Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights, 211 the Board of
Supervisors adopted a resolution which dealt with the adoption of children
by same-sex couples and the position of the Catholic Church, which was
against such adoptions.212 The Catholic League argued that the passage of
the resolution violated the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution.2 13 In reviewing de novo and then granting the board's Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, the court reasoned that the resolution passed
211. See generally id.
212. Id. at 597. The full text of the resolution, Res. No. 168-06, titled "Resolution
urging Cardinal Levada to withdraw his directive to Catholic Charities forbidding the
placement of children in need of adoption with same-sex couples," is the following:
Resolution urging Cardinal William Levada, in his capacity as head of the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith at the Vatican, to withdraw his
discriminatory and defamatory directive that Catholic Charities of the
Archdiocese of San Francisco stop placing children in need of adoption with
homosexual households.
WHEREAS, It is an insult to all San Franciscans when a foreign country, like
the Vatican, meddles with and attempts to negatively influence this great
City's existing and established customs and traditions such as the right of
same-sex couples to adopt and care for children in need; and
WHEREAS, The statements of Cardinal Levada and the Vatican that "Catholic
agencies should not place children for adoption in homosexual households,"
and "Allowing children to be adopted by persons living in such unions would
actually mean doing violence to these children" are absolutely unacceptable to
the citizenry of San Francisco; and
WHEREAS, Such hateful and discriminatory rhetoric is both insulting and
callous, and shows a level of insensitivity and ignorance which has seldom
been encountered by this Board of Supervisors; and
WHEREAS, Same-sex couples are just as qualified to be parents as are
heterosexual couples; and
WHEREAS, Cardinal Levada is a decidedly unqualified representative of his
former home city, and of the people of San Francisco and the values they hold
dear; and
WHEREAS, The Board of Supervisors urges Archbishop Niederauer and the
Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of San Francisco to defy all
discriminatory directives of Cardinal Levada; now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED, That the Board of Supervisors urges Cardinal William Levada,
in his capacity as head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith at the
Vatican (formerly known as Holy Office of the Inquisition), to withdraw his
discriminatory and defamatory directive that Catholic Charities of the
Archdiocese of San Francisco stop placing children in need of adoption with
homosexual households.
Id. at 597-98.
213. Id. at 598. Specifically, the Catholic League filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in
the Northern District of California, "alleging that the Resolution violates the
Establishment Clause by expressing disapproval of and hostility towards the Catholic
Church and Catholic religious tenets. Catholic League sought 'nominal damages, a
declaration that this anti-Catholic resolution is unconstitutional, and a permanent
injunction enjoining this and other official resolutions, pronouncements, or declarations
against Catholics and their religious beliefs."' Id.
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constitutional scrutiny, applying the three-part Lemon test and comparing a
similar case, American Family Ass'n, Inc. v. City & County of San

Francisco.214 The court ultimately held, after an extended discussion, that
"[p]roperly contextualized, the Resolution does not have the purpose or
primary effect of expressing hostility towards Catholic religious beliefs,
and it does not foster excessive government entanglement with the Catholic
Church."2 15
Recognizing a consistent theme in certain resolutions, the court observed
that "[t]he Board's extensive and persistent practice of passing non-binding
resolutions denouncing discrimination against gays and lesbians also
shapes the message the Resolution conveys. The Board's secular defense
of same-sex couples in all aspects of life is the dominant theme of the

Board's actions."216
These types of resolutions, while non-binding, are often passed in hopes
of gathering community or political support around a position urged by the
governing body. An example is a resolution passed in Carrboro, North
Carolina, in response to a local YMCA's consideration of merging with a
regional YMCA that had a less-inclusive sexual orientation policy. 2 17 The
214. See id. at 599-600, 608; see generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971); Am. Family Ass'n, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002).
The three-part Lemon test examines the government's action by asking if it has a
secular legislative purpose, looking at whether it has the primary effect of either
advancing or inhibiting religion, and determining whether it results in an "excessive
government entanglement" with religion. Am. Family Ass'n, Inc., 277 F.3d at 1121.
215. Catholic League, 567 F.3d at 608.
216. The court noted numerous instances where, through resolutions, the Board
sought to defend same-sex couples:
See Resolution No. 73-05 ("Resolution urging the Supreme Court of the
United States to rescind their refusal and to accept the hearing of a legal
challenge to Florida's prohibition of adoption of children by gays and
lesbians"); Resolution No. 129-06 ("Resolution urging the IRS to reconsider
their ruling on Domestic Partners and Community Property"); Resolution No.
166-06 ("Resolution urging Governor Schwarzenegger to submit amicus brief
to New York Supreme Court of Appeals in support of the right of same-sex
civil marriage"); Resolution No. 364-06 ("Resolution condemning the
government sanctioned violence and chaos which took place during Moscow's
first Gay Pride march"); Resolution No. 127-05 ("Resolution urging ...
Secretary of Education to publicly apologize to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender community"); Resolution No. 454-05 ("Resolution condemning
the offensive and discriminatory training video shown to San Francisco 49er
players"); Resolution No. 308-03 ("Resolution urging Senator Rick Santorum
to step down from his leadership position in the Republican Party and to
apologize for his comments [comparing homosexuality to polygamy, incest,
and adultery]"); Resolution No. 199-00 ("Resolution urging Dr. Laura
Schlessinger to refrain from making inaccurate statements about gays and
lesbians that incite violence and hate) ....
Id. at 606-07.

217. See Lisa Sorg, LGTB Policy Divides Chapel Hill-CarrboroYMCA and YMCA
of the Triangle, INDY WEEK (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/lgbt-
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local YMCA responded by stating publicly that the group would seek to
218
protect the gay community during the merger discussions.
policy-divides-chapel-hill-carrboro-ymca-and-ymca-of-the-triangle (reporting on the
controversy regarding the lack of an explicit statement in the regional YMCA's
employment handbook prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
contrast to the local YMCA's handbook); see also JUNE 14, 2011 MINUTES, CARRBORO
BD. OF ALDERMEN (2011), available at http://www.townofcarrboro.org/boa/Minutes/
2011/06_14_2011 .pdf. The resolution reads:
Resolution Regarding the Possible Merger of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro YMCA
and the YMCA of the Triangle
With Regard to Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Policies
Resolution No. 146/2010-11:
WHEREAS, the Carrboro Board of Aldermen supports all efforts to afford
equal protection under the law to Carrboro citizens regardless of sexual
orientation, identity or expression, and has done everything possible under the
law to make this a reality in Carrboro; and
WHEREAS, the Board of Aldermen notes that the Town of Chapel Hill, the
Chapel Hill-Carrboro School System and Orange County have also supported
efforts over the years to eradicate discrimination based on sexual orientation;
and
WHEREAS, there are many citizens in Carrboro and Chapel Hill who are
members of the Chapel Hill-Carrboro YMCA, and the Chapel Hill-Carrboro
YMCA has received or receives funding on occasion from the Town of Chapel
Hill and Orange County for various programs; and
WHEREAS, it has come to the attention of the Aldermen that the Chapel HillCarrboro YMCA is in discussions with the YMCA of the Triangle about a
possible merger, and the Aldermen understand that this will be further
discussed by the YMCA Board on June 22, 2011 with a decision to be made at
a later date; and
WHEREAS, the Board of Aldermen is aware that the Chapel Hill-Carrboro
YMCA has anti-discrimination policies based on sexual orientation; for
example, their job application states that "[i]t is the policy of the Chapel HillCarrboro YMCA to ensure equal employment opportunity as to all terms,
conditions, & privileges of employment without discrimination or harassment
on the basis of. . . sexual orientation;" further, registered domestic partners are
allowed to register as families or couples; and
WHEREAS, the Board of Aldermen applauds the Chapel Hill-Carrboro
YMCA for these progressive and fair policies, as they are a reflection of our
communities; and
WHEREAS, the Board of Aldermen is concerned because the YMCA of the
Triangle does not have anti-discrimination policies with regard to sexual
orientation; and
WHEREAS, the Board of Aldermen is concerned that if the Chapel HillCarrboro YMCA proceeds with this merger and is required to drop or modify
its non-discrimination policies with regard to sexual orientation that this will
be a terrible regression on this issue and the progressive policies of our Town
and County; and
THEREFORE, WE RESOLVE to urge the Chapel Hill-Carrboro YMCA to not
merge with the YMCA of the Triangle unless the YMCA of the Triangle
passes a non-discrimination policy which includes sexual orientation, and
implements a new appropriate membership policy.
Id.
218. Mark Schultz, Chapel Hill-Carrboro YMCA Will Seek Protectionsfor Gay
Community in Possible Merger, NEWS & OBSERVER (June 28, 2011, 6:02 PM),
http://blogs.newsobserver.com/bullseye/chapel-hill-carrboro-ymca-will-seekprotections-for-gay-community-in-possible-merger
(noting the local YMCA's
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A rather extreme example involving the use of resolutions took place as
various councils and boards in North Carolina passed resolutions urging
support or disapproval of the marriage amendment vote which took place in
May of 2012. The attorney for Durham County advised his Board of
County Commissioners that taking a position regarding the marriage
amendment would be a violation of a law that the North Carolina General
Assembly recently enacted. 219 The law, entitled "Limitation on the use of
public funds," states that "[a] county shall not use public funds to endorse
or oppose a referendum, election or a particular candidate for elective
office." 2 20 Setting aside the argument that it is questionable at best to say
that passing a resolution of this sort constituted the use of public funds, 22 1
the board was criticized by many for lacking "courage" in failing to support
a resolution that would have disapproved of the amendment, particularly
because the county's own domestic partner benefits were at stake.222
V. CONCLUSION
Living in a nation that does not yet treat its gay citizens as legally equal,
it is incumbent upon state and local governments to step forward and act.
This article has focused on how local government can fill this void. Our
cities and towns have long been viewed as special places of community; it
stands to reason, then, that the governing bodies of these places should feel
entrusted with a momentous task. As articulated by President Lyndon
Johnson:
The American city should be a collection of communities where every
member has a right to belong. . . . It should be a place where each

individual's dignity and self-respect is strengthened by the respect and
affection of his neighbors. It should be a place where each of us can find
the satisfaction and warmth which comes from being a member of the
community of man. This is what man sought at the dawn of civilization.

statement in a press release that it has stressed the importance of offering protections to
the LGBT community in its merger talks with the regional YMCA).

219. Ray Gronberg, Commissioners Scrap Resolution on Amendment One, HERALD
SUN (Apr. 23, 2012), http://heraldsun.com/bookmark/18334919 (reporting that the
County Attorney had sided with a GOP activist who previously informed county
officials that a formal vote by commissioners opposing the amendment would violate
state law).
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-456 (2012).
221. See, e.g., Dollar v. Town of Cary, 569 S.E.2d 731, 733-34 (N.C. App. 2002)
(granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff after finding that the primary
purpose of advertisements was to influence voters, where the defendant Town
promoted "smart growth" and "managed growth" policies by spending $200,000 on
advertising during a campaign season where smart growth was a contested issue).
222. See Gronberg, supra note 219 (providing the views of critics of the board's
decision).
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It is what we seek today. 223
Local governments must seek to become educated about the tools
available to them, in the context of their local authority and their gay
climate, so that they can work to attain legal rights for their gay citizens. It
is apparent in this day and age that this is the way that legal progress is
made with regard to these rights.
Because our founding fathers chose for us a dual legal system, one where
power was shared, the process of nationwide change, while appropriately
checked and balanced in many areas, can be excruciating in the context that
is the subject of this article. Yet, it is obvious that change is slowly taking
place with regard to legal rights for our gay citizens. Advocacy from the
elected officials who are on the ground level with this community can and
should progress in a "bottom-up" manner until the day this is no longer
necessary.

223. 1 LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Special Message to the Congress on the Nation's
Cities, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B.
JOHNSON 231, 240 (1965).
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